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The signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European 
Union (EU) and the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) nations dominated the 
multilateral trade agenda in late 2007 and early 2008. While the Caribbean nations 
signed the full EPAs, some of the African countries only singed interim agreements 
with the EU and a number of West African countries chose not to sign any EPA. 
Using the case of Botswana’s export markets, especially in agriculture, it is argued 
that the interim Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA, which 
was signed by Botswana and her neighbours, with the exception of South Africa, may 
have been economically sensible in protecting Botswana’s rural poor, at least in the 
short run. By tracing trade flows from the border to specifically poor sectors of the 
country, the importance of the beef exports sector to the poor and rural communities 
was found. The potential effects on the most significant exports of tariff bands 
associated with preferential agreements with the EU were found to be most beneficial 
in comparison to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and the South Africa-EU Trade 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) tariff bands. But it is also argued 
that the EPA will most likely have far reaching long run costs on regional economic 
development and institutional integration, within the SADC and Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). 
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In the months leading to the end of 2007, the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the European Union (EU) caused numerous debates globally 
with respect to the agreements’ actual and perceived short and long term 
economic effects in Developing and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (e.g. 
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Makhan, 2007; ODI, 2007; Rampa, 2007). At the start of 2008, eighteen 
developing and LDC countries in Africa signed the EPAs within their Regional 
Trade Areas (RTA), for example the East Africa Community (ECDPM and 
ODI, 2008). However, in the last days leading to the deadlines for the signing, 
many of these countries were still unclear about their own bargaining 
positions with the EU and the associated costs and benefits of the EPAs to 
their economic and political agendas (Makhan, 2007:5). Even after the signing 
of what became the interim EPAs, it was still unclear whether some of the 
signatory countries would still sign the next phase of the EPAs, for instance on 
issues pertaining to trade agreements in services, investments, 
telecommunications, finance, etc. (Weidlich, 2008). Much of the uncertainty 
came specifically from a lack of clarity regarding the economic effects of the 
EPAs on: a) the countries’ local industrial development objectives, b) regional 
integration processes, for example on the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), c) local and vulnerable economic sectors, and ultimately, 
d) on poverty alleviation in efforts in Developing and LDC countries. 
 
The paper argues that the interim EPAs may be good for protecting poor 
populations if they could provide the required levels of protection of 
identified vulnerable sectors, which directly affect these populations in slowly 
liberalising economies. But the agreements would only be effective as 
measures of protection and against absolute poverty in the short run. In terms 
of industrial development objectives, the agreements would have huge and 
hard to quantify cost implications. The EPAs would unfortunately also render 
regional trade areas and agreements difficult to sustain in the developing 
world. 
 
The case of Botswana, a member country of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU), is used to illustrate these assertions. The paper explores the 
potential effects of EPAs on the country’s agricultural sector, with specific 
focus on beef export markets. This is because these markets have always been 
important for the rural and poor communities’ livelihoods and have created 
the most significant links between open trade policies and poverty reduction 
efforts in this country. 
 
In Section 2, the methods used in collecting and analysing data are presented. 
Background information on seemingly uncoordinated and desperate events 
leading to the signing of the EPAs is provided in Section 3. A review of some 
relevant trade theory is presented in Section 4. Botswana’s economy, trade 
policies and agreements are discussed in Section 5. A discussion of the EPA’s 




section concludes with some policy recommendations for Botswana and for 
some of its neighbours in southern Africa. 
 
2. Research  methods 
 
The Most Favoured Nation (MFN), ACP and Trade Development and 
Cooperation (TDCA) export tariff schedule data for specified sectors were 
sourced from the Market Access Map (MacMap, 2008) database. These were 
used to compare the potential economic effects of an EPA between Botswana 
and the EU against the likely effects of the TDCA and MFN tariff schedules on 
the country’s economy, respectively. The comparative effects were computed 
and analysed for Botswana’s top eight3 export products (in monetary value 
terms). Data on trade flows of these export products was sourced, at the HS6 
level4, from the TIPS (2008) database. Other secondary trade and policy data 
were collected from sources including the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI, 2007) and the UNDP (2008) reports. The data were used to describe 
Botswana’s macroeconomy and her trade liberalisation policies. Simple 
Microsoft excel pivot tables were used to analyse Botswana’s trade flows and to 
compare the likely economic effects of the three export tariff schedules on such 
flows and the wider economy. 
 
3.  Background: the rush towards EPAs 
 
The EPAs between the EU and ACP countries came into force in September 
2002 following the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 between 79 ACP 
countries and the then 15 members of the EU. The objectives of the EPAs were 
to introduce open trade in line with the WTO GAT Article XXIV requirements 
between the two trading blocks and to gradually promote economic 
development with competitive markets in ACP countries (Makhan, 2007; 
Rampa, 2007). The Cotonou Agreement allowed the signatories a maximum 
w i n d o w  p e r i o d  o f  f i v e  y e a r s ,  b e g i n n i n g  i n  2 0 0 2 ,  t o  n e g o t i a t e  m o r e  W T O  
compatible agreements in areas like market access, trade in services, rules of 
origin, etc. During the five year period, the ACP countries would be allowed 
non-reciprocal preferential access in agricultural exports, with duty free 
custom and quota rates into EU markets. However, the EPA’s implementation 
would over time erode such preferences, encouraging more open trade 
between partners. Hence, because such an erosion (if not accompanied by 
proportional sectoral development) would leave many economic sectors in 
ACP countries vulnerable in multilateral trade negotiations, the controversies 
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surrounding the EPAs emerged as the five year window period neared its end 
in late 2007 (Julian & Makhan, 2007). The ACP RTAs, like the SACU, SADC, 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),5 etc., and individual 
member countries adopted a variety of negotiation positions with respect to 
the EPA offers they would accept from the EU. The various categories or 
attributes of different interim EPAs signed by different African countries are 
presented in detail in ECDPM and ODI (2008). Within this legal and time 
constrained negotiation environment, the EU proposed what was dubbed a 
‘flexible’ two-step approach to conclude the EPA deals.6 The deals would 
“focus on signing ‘interim’ and WTO-compatible EPAs on goods market 
access with ACP regions, sub-regions or individual non-Least Developed 
Countries (LCD). (And) all remaining details would then be negotiated and 
agreed to in early 2008”. If some of the ACP countries were unable to sign 
these interim deals they would then be subjected to the General System of 
Preferences (GSP). This would lead to ACP countries facing higher export 
tariffs (Julian & Makhan, 2007:14). 
 
3.1   The SADC group 
 
At the end of 2007 the members of the SADC region, which includes 
Botswana, worked towards accepting the EPA market access in goods 
agreement, with most discussion taking place within SACU. But the members 
were not in full agreement for a common position with respect to trade in 
agricultural products and services that would be suitable to country-specific 
economies and their development goals. For instance, the BLNS countries7 in 
SACU, which do not possess the same levels of economic development 
compared to South Africa8 (and which have had significantly lower levels of 
bargaining power within SACU), had different ambitions and economic 
pursuits regarding trade agreements affecting their agricultural export 
products. While Botswana’s concerns were focussed on protecting the 
preferential access of her beef exports to the EU, Tanzania’s concerns revolved 
around protecting her fisheries industries and South Africa’s interests lay with 
pursuing a more liberal trade environment, which was encouraged by the 
TDCA with the EU. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that the various SADC 
member countries signed their EPAs with varied intentions and within 
different regions. For example, Tanzania signed her EPA within the East 
Africa Community (EAC) and South Africa chose not to sign the SADC-
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negotiated EPAs at the start of 2008. The BLNS countries in SACU (including 
Mozambique) in the SADC region signed EPAs with the EU, which 
maintained preferential access into selected EU markets. The agreements were 
only provisional and were to be negotiated further to include trade 
agreements on issues like trade in services. 
 
These intra-regional developments pose serious questions with regard to the 
political cohesiveness and economic sustainability of the regional grouping. 
But more important is to understand what is really at stake for some of the 
SACU members in their EPA negotiations and what economic consequences 
their choices could have in their short and long run attempts at economic 
development. For example, how would the EPAs affect poverty alleviation 
efforts and attempts at reducing economic inequalities in a country like 
Botswana? Before this analysis, a review of some trade theory on how trade 
may or may not lead to economic development and social equality is 
presented, forming a framework for the discussion. 
 
4.  A review of some trade theory 
 
Cattaneo and Dodd (2007) report that trade liberalisation would only lead to 
poverty9 reduction if potential and positive net income, material and social 
assets accumulating from the process were effectively distributed in favour of 
the poor. For this assertion to be true trade liberalisation must result in 
positive net incomes, social assets, etc., and for these net gains to result in 
reduced levels of poverty and inequality, some mechanism should be in place 
to redistribute effectively the income and social assets for the benefit of the 
poor in society. To be noted is that the same assumptions also form the initial 
ideological thinking in favour of the long run developmental goals of the EU’s 
EPA negotiations with ACP countries (Rampa, 2007). 
 
With respect to the first link between trade liberalisation and net economic 
growth, conflicting evidence exists on whether the liberalisation process leads 
to higher growth. In cross country studies conducted by Dollar (1992) and 
Sachs and Warner (1995) evidence was presented indicating that the 
liberalisation process indeed leads to net growth. However, Rodrigues and 
R o d r i k  ( 2 0 0 1 )  c o n t e n d  t h a t  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  w e r e  b a s e d  o n  w e a k  e m p i r i c a l  
evidence and inaccurate measures of open trade. Nevertheless, economists 
now generally accept that for trade openness to result in positive economic 
growth within a country, complementary policies should be in place. For 
example such policies must encourage internal investments (Taylor, 1998) and 
build on appropriate institutional arrangements (Rodrik, 1999). 
                                                            




Most neoclassical approaches, which link trade liberalisation to the 
accumulation and distribution of incomes, rely on the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
and its Stolper-Samuelson corollary (Samuelson, 1971). The Heckscher-Ohlin 
model concludes that a country holds a comparative advantage in goods 
whose production is based on comparatively abundant factors. This means 
that any trading country should focus on production processes that use the 
country’s most abundant factors, relative to trading partners. Such is the case 
because opening trade would increase the relative price of the exported 
product which uses the most abundant input. This would expand that export 
sector as well as the demand for factor inputs used. In a production process, 
which for example is reliant only on capital and labour inputs and which is 
also labour intensive, the real wage would increase. Such is the case because in 
that sector the returns to capital would (together with the prices of competing 
import goods) fall. Using this framework, the Stolper-Samuelson corollary 
concludes that if, for example the agricultural sector, used primarily unskilled 
labour, then trade liberalisation would benefit that type of labour input at the 
expense of skilled labour in an unskilled labour abundant country (Cattaneo & 
Dodd, 2007; Winters et al., 2004). 
 
But such neoclassical approaches have a number of limitations, mostly flowing 
from the assumptions made in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. For example, the 
assumption of perfectly competitive markets in developing countries is not 
only misleading but far from realistic. The corollary also fails to deal with 
middle income economies, which have a mix of skilled and unskilled labour 
inputs. In such economies, the gains from trade could only be achieved based 
on who the trading partner is (i.e. a relatively more developed or a less 
developed trading partner). Another limitation here is that the trading 
partners are only engaged in bilateral trade activities. 
 
Furthermore, McKay et al. (1997), Winters (2000) and Cattaneo and Dodd 
(2007:9) also argue that an unskilled labour pool in a given country may not be 
necessarily composed of the most poor section of society. The poor are often 
excluded from formal labour markets. Again, the distributional effects of trade 
liberalisation processes not only depend on the wages of the poor but also on 
the consumption patterns of the poor. Hence a more realistic framework for 
analysis was developed by Winters (2000), and is also presented in McCulloch 
et al. (2001) and Winters et al. (2004) (see Figure 1). 
 
The framework recognises the institutional and social factors in linkages 
between trade liberalisation, economic growth and poverty reduction, which 
go far beyond the Stolper-Samuelson framework. It helps in exploring the real 




markets and households as well as in government revenue generation and 
expenditure patterns. In this framework no generalisations can be extrapolated 
for all countries or sectors. 
 
 
Figure 1:   The  analytical  scheme  of links between trade policy and 
 poverty  (Source: McCulloch et al., 2001:66) 
 
In Figure 1, a representation of how trade policy effects are transmitted to the 
poor is illustrated. Various market and government transactions as influenced 
by trade policy, distribute incomes, material and social assets among different 
economic players, which include individuals and households. Winters et al. 
(2004) also propose that questions aimed at investigating links between these 
transactions and poverty alleviation need to look at how poor individuals and 
households are affected in terms of development. They also propose that these 
questions should be grouped into four key areas; a) growth and stability, b) 
behaviour of households and markets, c) wages and employment, and d) 
government’s social policy role. For example, questions that need answers in 
the area of behaviour of households and markets should investigate; a) the 
way in which border price shocks are transmitted to local households, 
especially the poor, b) the way in which markets are either destroyed or 
created for the same households, c) if there are any positive or negative spill-
over effects for poor households, and d) the way in which open trade policy 
limits or enhances risk vulnerability of the poor (Winters et al., 2004). 
 
This means that research answers need to be based on a broad and deep 
understanding of the various drivers of a given economy, in this instance, of 
Botswana. The questions also require a thorough understanding of the 
objectives of the most important development and trade public policies 
(including challenges). The drivers and policies would then dictate how and in 
which sectors price shocks are transmitted for the benefit and/or loss of 
market players/sectors. An overview of Botswana’s economy, trade policies 




the basis for discussing how, for example, Botswana’s EPA position would 
affect economic sectors and whether it would benefit its poor. 
 
5.  Botswana’s economic trends, trade policies and agreements 
 
Since 1965 Botswana’s economy has grown remarkably. For example, in the 
1970s some years were characterised by real GDP growth rates of more than 
15%.10 In the last forty years the mining sector has been the core driver of the 
country’s economic growth. In 2007, this sector contributed 41% towards 
national real GDP. In comparison, the government sector contributed 17%, the 
trade and the financial services sector contributed 11% each (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2:   Sectoral contributions towards total GDP (Source: Econsult, 
2007:5) 
 
The figure presents a picture of an economy with little diversity away from the 
mining11 and government sectors. The domination of the mining sector has 
also ensured that minerals contributed 78% towards total exports in the last 
ten years, with a significant trade surplus in merchandise exports. Although 
very small in comparison, exports in services have also grown at an average of 
28% per annum in nominal terms between 1995/6 and 2005/6, a rise from 
seven to 20%. 
 
Botswana’s import flows, on the other hand, were fairly diversified in 2006. 
Machinery, fuel and food contributed close to 50% of total merchandise 
imports. While a majority of Botswana’s exports went to the EU, most of her 
                                                            
10 For example, in 1978 Botswana’s GDP growth rate was twenty percent 




imports came from the SADC region (especially from South Africa). Table 1 
presents a percentage breakdown of export and import trade flows for 2006. 
 
Table 1:   Botswana’s 2006 export and import trade flows in nominal 
terms 
Principal exports (%)  Principal merchandise imports (%) 
Diamonds  78  Machinery & electric equipment  18 
Copper Nickel  14  Fuel  16 
Textiles  3  Food, beverages & tobacco  13 
Soda ash  1.8  Chemicals, rubber products  13 
Beef  1.3  Vehicle & transport equipment  11 
Vehicles  0.7  Textiles, wood, furniture, etc.  11 
    Metals & metal products  8 
Gold 0.8  Other  10 
(Source: UNDP, 2008) 
 
The flows in Table 1 indicate that only a small percentage of export markets 
had a direct effect or link to poor people in Botswana. The small agricultural 
and textiles sectors in terms of export contributions employ mostly the 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour force and most of those involved in the beef 
sector reside in rural communities (ODI, 2007). Around two thirds of the rural 
population are found to be directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture 
(FAO, 2005:1). Livestock rearing, specifically, is central to these agricultural 
activities and BIDPA (2006:62) argues that this is an important contributing 
factor to poverty alleviation and development, also because 75% of cattle 
owners are small-scale farmers with a herd size of between one and nineteen 
cattle. Moreover with, a) structurally low productivity rates especially on 
communal lands, b) strong linkages between the export sector and the rural 
economy, Jefferis (2007, cited in ODI, 2007) argues that the supply response in 
beef production to world price changes is highly elastic. Therefore, although 
Botswana’s agricultural sector is relatively small in terms of real GDP and 
formal employment contributions, it remains highly important to populations 
who are formally and informally employed in rural areas (BEDIA, 2008).12  
 
On the other hand, the dominant mining sector had little direct relevance to 
the poor, with only three percent of formal employment reported for that 
sector. This was followed by trade services at 14%, manufacturing (12%), etc. 
(Figure 3). The government sector, on the other hand, was the biggest formal 
employer at 38% (Econsult, 2007). 
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Figure 3:   A breakdown of formal employment by sector as a percentage 
(Adapted from Econsult, 2007) 
 
A comparative juxtaposition of the employment breakdown (in Figure 3) on 
trade patterns (in Table 1) and the general economy (in Figure 2) form a useful 
application of Winters et al. (2001) analytical framework presented in Figure 1. 
For trade to have a meaningful effect on poverty reduction there needs to be a 
strong direct link between a majority of trade markets and economic activities 
of poor sections of society. This strong and direct link does not exist in 
Botswana. However, it is still obvious how open trade is important to the 
economy of Botswana as whole, mainly because of its big mining sector. 
Indirectly, the magnitude of the government’s fiscal redistribution role (from 
the mining sector to other quarters) ensures that a link between mining and 
the poor exists (Republic of Botswana, 2006:23-25).13 
 
Nonetheless, Botswana’s export markets need to be developed further to 
strengthen the direct trade and poverty linkages for the benefit of the poor and 
also to diversify economic activity away from diamond mining (WTO, 2007). 
Moreover, as a net importer of food, beverages and tobacco, it should be 
obvious that Botswana needs to formulate export policies and be part of trade 
agreements that protect the, especially the rural poor. With respect to imports 
from South Africa, the BLNS countries (in SACU) need to have a greater 
influence on South Africa’s import policies. In the following subsections some 
of her trade policies and agreements are outlined. 
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5.1   The trade policy framework 
 
To support private sector led export growth, Botswana has entered into 
bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements with numerous partners. 
The most important of these are outlined in Table 2. They are differentiated by 
geographical scope, type and status. 
 
Table 2:   Botswana’s important trade agreements 
Agreement  Type and current status  Geographical 
scope 
WTO  Doha round of negotiations is ongoing. Other agreements under 
the WTO include the GATS, SPS agreement, Agreement on 
agriculture, Agreement on technical barriers to trade, Agreement 
on trade in intellectual property rights, etc. 
Multilateral 
SACU  A customs union that was established in 1910 with a commonly 
shared external tariff and revenue. The latest renegotiated 
mandate was in 2002. This came with a new revenue sharing 
formula and institutions. It is argued that because of South 
Africa’s dominant position in SACU, the BLNS countries have 
become  de facto signatories to the Trade Development 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA, 1999). The agreement gradually 
seeks to build a free trade area between South Africa and the EU 
after 12 years (i.e. in 2012). By then, the liberal TDCA tariffs will 
effectively apply to the whole SACU region 
Regional 
SADC FTA  Based on SADC Trade Protocol. Through the ongoing tariff 
reduction schedules, SADC countries are to liberalise their tariffs 
fully by 2012. Negotiations on a framework agreement for 




A trade in goods agreement has been signed between the EU 
and a sub group of SADC which include Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. Angola is aiming to also 
sign an EPA (refer to background discussion in Section 2). 
Regional 
AGOA  A unilateral agreement of the US offering AGOA eligible 
countries enhanced market access under the GSP scheme. 




A trade agreement between SACU and Mercosur, which was 
concluded and signed in 2005. Mercosur’s member countries are 




A bilateral trade agreement for reciprocal duty-free entry 




A bilateral trade agreement for reciprocal duty-free entry 
between Botswana and Zimbabwe. It came into force in 1988 
Bilateral 
(Source: UNDP, 2008) 
 
From the list in Table 2, it is clear that even though the EPAs are very 
important for Botswana, they are not her only trade negotiation platform. Also 
given the fact that most of the country’s imports in merchandise and services 
come from the SACU region while her most significant exports to the EU are 
tariff free diamonds, Botswana has more than the EPAs to consider in 




Botswana’s agricultural exports, hence it remains relevant in the fights against 
poverty through trade policy. Therefore, the question of whether or not 
Botswana and its neighbours took economically sound positions in signing or 
rejecting the EPAs is an important one. 
 
6.  The EPAs and Botswana 
 
It is argued that in terms of making immediate gains in total welfare, it was 
sensible for Botswana to sign an EPA with the EU. In terms of achieving her 
long term developmental goals, however, it is not so clear cut that the signing 
was as sensible. This is also speculated on in Rampa (2007) and Makhan 
(2007). Being part of the SACU region, the case of Botswana’s EPA 
negotiations should not only be analysed by comparing its economic outcomes 
to the MFN or GSP tariff schedules, but also to outcomes stemming from 
South Africa’s TDCA (refer to Table 2). More than 75% of Botswana’s imports 
come from the SACU region, of which a majority comes from South Africa. 
Because of the SACU common external tariff, Botswana was by and large 
subjected to tariffs paid at South African borders (Tralac, 2008c). In addition, 
because of the common revenue sharing formula, all BLNS countries receive 
positive net trade revenues from SACU’s common revenue pool, while South 
Africa’s net revenue from the same pool is negative. The implication is that 
South Africa not only controls the (trade) policies of BLNS countries via its 
dominance in exports to BLNS markets, but also via the net revenue transfers 
to SACU countries (Tralac, 2008a). Therefore, the TDCA tariff schedule was 
always bound to have serious effects on the welfare of Botswana and other 
SACU members. 
 
6.1   The EPA effects on exporters and consumers 
 
If Botswana were not to sign an EPA with the EU, she would lose all 
preferential access into EU markets offered under the Cotonou Agreement. 
More than likely her exporters would have to pay tariffs applicable under the 
GSP schedule for which Botswana as a middle income developing country 
would be eligible. But the GSP system excludes beef and its products, which 
are the second most important export for Botswana. Hence upon losing the 
Cotonou preferences, Botswana would face the MFN tariff schedule for its 
most important exports, which are also the most relevant to her poor 
households. In that scenario Botswana’s beef exports would have experienced 
applied tariffs increase from 5% under the Cotonou agreement to MFN tariffs 
ranging from 70 to 140%. The potential tariff increases from losing the 
Cotonou provisions to being subjected to the MFN are illustrated for Botswana 




Botswana’s share of the EU import market (even with the current favourable 
agreement) is small, at 0.4% minimum to 14% maximum, compared, to say, 
big exporters like Brazil (at 43 to 78%, respectively). However, Botswana’s 
share is comparable to Namibia’s. 
 
Table 3: EU markets for Botswana beef and its major competitors 
in quota (d) out quota in quota (d) out quota
Brazil 419,622    731,769    20% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) 83,924        275,730    20% 66%
Argentina 345,042    478,241    20% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) 69,008        189,264    20% 55%
Uruguay 90,874      138,866    20% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) 18,175        53,764      20% 59%
Australia 46,750      81,023      20% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) 9,350          30,566      20% 65%
Namibia 23,110      44,451      0%+24.2€(a) 0% + 303.4€(b) 1,076          13,486      5% 58% 71%
Botswana 19,574      36,668     0%+24.2€(a) 0% + 303.4€(b) 887           11,125    5% 57% 70%
Chile 7,746        14,818      0% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) -              5,487        0% 71%
New Zealand 7,418        11,813      20% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) 1,484          4,534        20% 61%
Canada 5,914        6,729        20% 12.8% + 303.4€(b) 1,183          2,799        20% 47%
Brazil 12,172      58,806      20% 12.8% + 221.1€(b) 2,434          14,560      20% 120%
Namibia 2,882        14,894      0%+17.6€(a) 0% + 221.1€(b) 262             3,293        9% 114% 127%
Botswana 2,630        9,520        0%+17.6€(a) 0% + 221.1€(b) 168           2,105      6% 80% 93%
Uruguay 600          2,696        20% 12.8% + 221.1€(b) 120             673           20% 112%
Argentina 427          1,635        20% 12.8% + 221.1€(b) 85               416           20% 98%
Thailand 54            250           20% 12.8% + 221.1€(b) 11               62             20% 115%
New Zealand 12            45             20% 12.8% + 221.1€(b) 2                 11             20% 97%
Brazil 288,866    834,361    20% 12.8% + 304.1€(b) 57,773        290,704    20% 101%
Uruguay 46,555      109,898    20% 12.8% + 304.1€(b) 9,311          39,379      20% 85%
Argentina 20,813      55,209      20% 12.8% + 304.1€(b) 4,163          19,453      20% 93%
New Zealand 9,209        12,305      20% 12.8% + 304.1€(b) 1,842          4,921        20% 53%
Botswana 1,508        6,310        0%+24.3€(a) 0%+304.1€(b) 153           1,919      10% 127% 140%
Namibia 802          2,677        0%+24.3€(a) 0%+304.1€(b) 65               814           8% 101% 114%
EU tariff 2007  Ad valorem equiv.  Imports 2006
Current (a) Current (a) In-quota (c)  Out-of quota  ACP post-
Cotonou 
(e)
CN 02013000: fresh or chilled bovine meat, boneless
CN 02023050: frozen bovine boneless crop, chuck and blade and brisket cuts
CN 02023090: frozen bovine boneless meat (excl. forequarters, whole or cut into a maximum of five pieces, each quarter 
being in a single block "compensated" quarters in two blocks, one of which contains the forequarter, whole or cut into 






(Mirror data compiled by the ODI (2007:14) from the Eurostat set)14 
 
With potential MFN ad valorem equivalent tariffs, for the CN 02023090 
classification of beef products, likely to increase from 0 to 140% and with 
Botswana share of the EU market, it is inconceivable that Botswana could 
export any beef to the EU under the MFN conditions. “The imposition of MFN 
duties would be equivalent to 80 percent of the revenue obtained in the EU 
market in 2006. It is hard to imagine even niche markets sustaining a price 
hike of this level or of the sector finding offsetting cost savings”(ODI, 2007:17). 
 
                                                            
14 Notes: (a) calculated on the value/volume of 2006 imports     
  (b) per 100 kg net     
  (c) Applies to high-quality (CN 0201300010) only.   
  (d) ACP duties/AVEs shown are for within ACP Protocol quotas only, not any global quotas  
       which may apply.     




A future with the MFN schedule tariffs applicable with the EU alongside a low 
level of competitiveness of Botswana’s beef export sector (refer to Table 3) 
would also impose huge challenges in finding alternative markets in countries 
like South Africa.15 Under the 2008 SADC EPA, however, Botswana gained 
Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) market access for all products, excluding sugar, 
rice, etc. Trade in these products still required further negotiation and 
agreement. In any case, Weidlich (2008) argues that the DFQF access to the EU 
for countries like Botswana and Namibia would, as of July 2008, have to be 
reciprocated by a similar magnitude of market access for EU exporters, on 80% 
of traded goods. 
 
Nonetheless, to further illustrate these likely negative effects16, not only 
directly on the beef sector, but on the top eight17 (in monetary value terms) of 
Botswana’s export products, Table 4 compares the levels of EPA, MFN, and 
the TDCA18 tariffs schedules on corresponding products. The comparison 
reiterates the argument that without the Cotonou agreement or a similarly 
favourable SADC EPA, Botswana’s exporters would be greatly disadvantaged. 
 
Table 4:   Botswana’s top eight EU exports (at HS6 level) versus bound 
tariff rates 







020130  Bovine cuts boneless, 
fresh or chilled  0.0  3.0  5.3 
020230  Bovine cuts boneless, 
frozen  0.0  0.8  5.7 
022290  Hide sections, bovine, 
nes, fresh or wet-salted  0.0  10.4  13.4 
610910  T-shirts, singlets and 
other vests of cotton, 
knit  0.0  0.0  5.4 
880330  Aircraft parts nes  0.0  0.0  4.6 
611090 Pullovers,  cardigans 
etc. of material nes knit  0.0  0.0  3.2 
840910 Parts  for  spark-ignition 
aircraft engines  0.0  0.0  2.0 
490700  Documents of title 
(bonds etc), unused 
stamps etc.  0.0  0.0  0.3 
(Source: MacMap, 2008; TIPS, 2008; Tralac 2008b) 
 
                                                            
15 The fact that there are no reported beef exports into SACU, even though trade is unrestricted in the union 
further illustrates Botswana’s lack of competitiveness in beef exports.   
16 From losing the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement.  
17 Excluding raw diamonds and products. 




Compiled from different data sets (MacMap, 2008; Tralac, 2008b), Table 4 
shows that the EPA schedule still presented Botswana with the least costly and 
most beneficial alternative for its top eight export products. The MFN 
schedule remained the most costly alternative with increases at 134% for some 
beef product classes. At the end of its liberalisation process in 2012, the TDCA 
schedule will still be less costly compared with the MFN. Based on the 
predictable immediate gains from the new EPAs to Botswana exporters, it 
makes sense that Botswana signed the SADC EPA with the EU to avoid facing 
the MFN (or even the TDCA) tariffs for its most important export products 
like beef. 
 
In fact the monetary gains, from the Duty Free Quota Free EU access 
component alone via the SADC EPA, were estimated by the ODI (2007) at 
18.98 mill euros using the MFN base and at 1.27 mill euros using the Cotonou 
agreement as the base. These are illustrated in Table 5 for 2006 exported 
volumes. Potential gains from the 1996 to 2006 export volumes (of 11.25 tons) 
are also presented for the respective schedules. 
 
Table 5:   Value of duty free quota free EU market access for Botswana’s 
beef exporters 
Period  Export volumes  Monetary benefits of DFQF 
    Compared to MFN  Compared to Cotonou 
2006  5.25 tons  18.96 mill euros  1.27 million euros 
1996-2006  11.25 tons  36.01 mill euros  2.47 million euros 
(Source: ODI, 2007) 
 
It is clear that the 2008 SADC EPA appears to have presented Botswana’s beef 
exporters significant immediate benefits when compared to no EPA (i.e. MFN) 
or when compared to the old Cotonou agreement. The benefits could be even 
higher if the Botswana beef sector was competitive enough and could meet its 
annual allocated quota of 18.9 tones to the EU under the Cotonou agreement. 
 
In any case, in any general equilibrium analyses, it is difficult to separate the 
effects on production from those of consumption, for example with respect to 
consumers who are also employees in sectors under investigation. These 
complex linkages were not even captured by the framework illustration in 
Figure 1. But the linkages of the beef sector and its exports to the livelihoods of 
poor households were demonstrated in the presentation of Botswana’s 
economy. Therefore, the EPA - facilitated access to EU markets should have 
contributed immensely to the sector’s sustainability and growth, and losing 
that access would have been detrimental to the rural economy of Botswana, 
which is heavily reliant on beef production. 




6.2    What are the long term effects on SACU import arrangements and 
development? 
 
Some of the reported reasons for South Africa not signing an EPA with the EU 
are telling with regard to potential future costs of this agreement. These relate 
to potential costs to regional integration as well as national industrial 
development objectives.19 As mentioned in Section 3, the 2008 EPA offers were 
only provisional, and they applied only to trade in goods.20 The second phase 
of the negotiations would include trade in services, investments, 
telecommunications, etc. In addition, when the time came for the DFQF access 
to be reciprocated for EU exporters in countries like Botswana, it can be 
concluded that this will lead to great confusions regarding which import tariff 
schedules to apply to EU imported products (i.e. current SACU (effectively 
TDCA) versus reciprocated EU free access). This will be a big institutional 
challenge for all SACU members. 
 
An analysis of the EPA impacts on Botswana’s import markets21 and her 
general welfare must consider the following points: 
a)  Currently, the EU imports to Botswana are not that significant, because 
an overwhelming 76% of Botswana’s imports originate from the SACU 
region and more specifically from South Africa (WTO, 2007). A 
percentage breakdown of Botswana’s important imports was provided 
in Table 1. In any case, SACU originated products are imported at zero 
rates within the RTA.22 
b)  The composition, percentage breakdown and origin of products in Table 
1 will more than likely change if the reciprocated EPA free access makes 
these and other substitute products from the EU relatively cheaper than 
from SACU. 
c)  Since Botswana’s import tariffs are the common SACU tariffs, the effects 
of any new tariffs must be compared to the effects of South Africa’s 
TDCA, since it has been argued that the TDCA provided the effective 
tariff schedule for the whole SACU region given South Africa’s 
dominance in the region. 
 
                                                            
19 For instance, in the long run the protection provided by the SADC EPAs will not promote competitiveness in 
the Botswana’s beef sector.   
20 The second round EPA negotiations will still have to cover trade in services, investment, finance, 
telecommunications, transport, energy, etc.  
21 The direct and in-depth analysis and discussion of the likely EPA impacts on Botswana’s imports are not 
presented in this paper  
22 The most important imported products from the EU are listed in order of significance in Appendix 1. The 
overlap between these products and those listed in Table is very small, which further indicates the current and 




On the other hand, since it is not clear yet what effects the EPA negotiations on 
services, investments, etc., would have on Botswana and other SACU 
members (Rampa, 2007). Therefore, although the EPAs may appear attractive 
when looking at immediate gains for sectors like Botswana’s exporters it is 
most likely that a high level of adjustment costs will be incurred in future. 
These are theoretically estimated at US$ 359 million per year during the first 
years of liberalisation (ECDPM and ODI, 2008:3). 
 
Among various factors that South Africa cited as reasons for not signing an 
EPA was the likely damage that such agreements would have on current and 
infant regional integration efforts (Weidlich, 2008). For instance, in the current 
case where SACU members have signed member specific EPAs23 with the EU 
(ECDPM and ODI, 2008), it will be institutionally challenging for these 
countries to institute their own and different import tariff cuts for EU 
exporters. This will interfere with the SACU external common tariff and 
revenue pool.24 It would then require a renegotiation of the SACU agreement. 
Basically, the costs stemming from this type of weakening of regional trade 
institutions would be hard to quantify but most definitely high. 
 
Connected to the allegation from various quarters that the current EPAs have 
betrayed their initial development agenda for ACP countries (e.g. Makhan, 
2007; Rampa, 2007) was South Africa’s refusal to sign an EPA, because the 
agreement would undermine the country’s trade-based industrial policies. 
Among other factors, the signing of a liberal TDCA with the EU was to 
implement the South Africa’s competition policies. An EPA, otherwise, would 
undermine any competitiveness of local industries. It is then quite ironic that 
while Botswana has accused South Africa and her dominance in SACU for 
undermining her own industrialisation history (UNDP, 2008), Botswana has 
signed an EPA which, at least in the short run, offers a high level of protection 
to inefficient local exporters. With the signing of the TDCA, South Africa 
opted to expose her industries to international competition at a much faster 
rate than EPAs would allow. 
 
That the signing of an EPA by Botswana would undermine her development 
potential was also a conclusion reached by Sigwele and Tseko (2005). They 
reached their conclusion by outlining a  s t r e a m  o f  i n c o m e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  
Botswana would forego were she not to embrace a fast paced liberalisation 
process, which conforms to the Article XXIV WTO trade rules. They used a 
                                                            
23 With different time frames to liberalise, different basket of goods for exclusion, etc.  
24 It is argued by the ECDPM and ODI (2008) that such developments may lead to other trade barriers and 




general equilibrium analysis to explore, for example, the poverty effects on 
Botswana’s economy through real income fluctuations. They concluded that: 
a)  The overall reduction in tariffs was most likely to enhance per head 
consumption of non-meat products and other luxury goods (e.g. 
furniture and cars), because most of these goods were imported, 
b)  The real incomes of skilled employees would increase by a percent for a 
ten percent increase in beef export earnings, assuming that lower tariffs 
would facilitate such an increase, 
c)  Households with self-employed members in rural and urban areas 
would experience a two percent real wage increase, but 
d) Households who relied on remittances would not benefit from any 
increased beef export earnings, also assuming that the sector would 
remain competitive without any EPA protection, 
e)  In general, the beef sector, and its employees, would reap higher 
benefits compared to outsiders, 
f)  Even though Botswana would face adjustments costs in the short run, 
most of which would be faced by rural households as indicated by the 
ODI (2007), their findings, in general, indicated a positive economic 
outlook at a macro-economic level, because of being more liberalised. 
 
These findings, however, are based on crucial but contestable assumptions. 
Firstly, compared to BLNS countries, it must be conceded that South Africa is 
already at a much higher level of industrial development and has a much 
more diversified economy. Hence, in the process of liberalisation, the 
adjustment costs it faces could not be as high as those facing the BLNS 
countries. Therefore South Africa could easily afford to forego any immediate 
EPA protection and benefits. In the case of Botswana, however, and contrary 
to Sigwele and Tseko’s (2005) conclusions, it cannot be assumed that a higher 
level of liberalisation would immediately lead to higher earnings in the beef or 
any other export sector. In fact, as argued by the ODI (2007), the opposite is 
more likely. 
 
Moreover, and in line with the ODI (2007) conclusions, the UNDP (2008) using 
the Agricultural Trade Simulation Model (ATPSM)25 and global trade flow 
data (TIPS, 2007) concluded that a cut in global tariffs and a reduction in 
domestic support would instead lead to drops in surplus earnings of 
Botswana’s beef producers, given a high price elasticity of beef’s supply (ODI, 
2007). For example, an across the board 60% cut in import tariffs would lead to 
an estimated loss of around P70 million in Botswana’s beef producer surplus. 
                                                            
25 The model has the following limitations: a) partial equilibrium analysis, b) assumes that monopoly powers do 
not exist in global markets, c) agricultural goods are perfect substitutes, d) non-price supply and demand 




Hence, whether or not Botswana really required the level of protection offered 
by the EPA, especially in the long term, remains hotly contestable. 
 
From the evidence presented, the decision for Botswana to sign an EPA makes 
sense only if short term gains for producers in affected sectors, like beef 
exports are taken into account. This should also include a consideration for 
protecting vulnerable rural communities who depend on these sectors for their 
livelihoods. The long run poses its own costs. Such costs are also reflected in 
South Africa’s decision not to sign an EPA, but to remain committed to the 
TDCA, which is better aligned to the country’s industrial development 
objectives. Hence, if the long run developmental costs by far exceed any 
immediate benefits from an EPA, such an agreement cannot be justified. 
 
7.  Conclusion and recommendations 
 
Botswana should begin to look seriously into the future. Her trade policies and 
agreements should complement her industrial development policies. While 
she has to protect her vulnerable sectors and communities this should not 
come at the expense of developing a globally competitive, diversified and 
sustainable economy. The signing of an EPA may have been sensible in 
protecting some agricultural sectors (like the beef sector) and rural households 
who were dependent on it; however, the move had associated costs with 
regard to the country’s long term development. 
 
W i t h  E P A s  h a v i n g  b e e n  s i g n e d  b y  B o t s w a n a  a n d  o t h e r  S A C U  m e m b e r s  
(excluding South Africa), one of the biggest challenges for the region has to be 
institutional in nature. The EPA signatories in SACU must now formulate and 
apply tariff schedules to EU exports to reciprocate the EU’s DFQF offer. These 
pose a conflicting challenge to SACU’s common external tariff and revenue 
sharing as agreed to in 2002. For such import tariff schedules to be 
independently set for EU exporters by the EPA signatories, the SACU 
members would have to renegotiate the 2002 agreement. 
 
In making these decisions, Botswana has to think about how her current 
imports from SACU, especially from South Africa would be affected. In the 
event that the SACU agreement breaks down, all BLNS countries may have to 
forego any net benefits from the common revenue pool. Many of the 
institutional challenges posed on the SACU agreement by the EPA, also apply 
to the proposed SADC FTA with fourteen members. Such challenges may in 
fact be bigger considering SADC’s relatively young age. These costs of the 
institutional challenges from the EPAs would also be hard to quantify. 




Otherwise, if somehow the 2002 SACU agreement remains intact, Botswana 
and other SACU members would still have to contend with the economic 
implications of South Africa’s TDCA with the EU. As argued, many of the 
BLNS countries already pay TDCA tariff rates to imports from South Africa, 
which originate from the EU. Hence, at the moment the Botswana-EU EPA is 
really relevant as it only affects beef exports to the EU. 
 
Moreover, if Botswana plans to stick by her interim EPA with the EU, soon she 
must formulate effective policy positions for the next phase of negotiations on 
services, investment, finance, telecommunications, etc. But even more 
important, Botswana and other ACP countries have to engage the EU’s alleged 
betrayal of the initial EPA’s development agenda. This could be approached 
from securing the EU’s commitment to development aid to ACP countries. In 
fact, with such aid in place, it would be much easier for Botswana to embrace 
trade liberalisation at a faster rate, which would mean less need for a 
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Appendix 1:   Botswana’s most important EU imports 
 
(Source: Tips, 2008) 